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The title of this essay might be fittingly substituted for the official cite
of the case of Cotton States Chemical Co., Inc. v. Larrison Enterprises,
Inc. 1 in which legal issues were thrown at sixes and sevens with little
restraint, if any at all.
The plaintiff had sold a liquid herbicide to the defendant rice farmer,
Larrison Inc. Larrison had been informed by employees of the distributor
of the liquid herbicide, Tide Products Inc., and apparently by employees
of Cotton States, that the herbicide could be aerially sprayed, rather than
applied in pellet form, with similar results. As it turned out, the rice field,
over which the liquid herbicide had been aerially sprayed, failed to yield
the expected crop. The court noted that "[t]he sale of the herbicide and the
alleged failure of the result of its application occurred more than one year
before this litigation arose,''2 implying that the farmer suspended his
payments which prompted Cotton States Chemical, the seller, to sue on
the open account. Thereupon, the defendant-farmer filed a reconventional
demand and third partied the manufacturer of the liquid herbicide, Stauffer
Chemical Company. In defense of his position Larrison attempted to raise
the issue of "misrepresentation" on the part of Cotton States, Tide
Products and Stauffer so as to be able to plead the advantages of "fraud."
The court of appeal was not convinced, however, and correctly concluded
that "[e]ven in cases where the seller (and the manufacturer, by presump-
tion) had knowledge of the redhibitory defect but failed to declare it, the
consumer must bring his action within one year following his discovery of
the defect." 3 The court went on to hold, therefore, that " [tihe exception
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 342 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
2. Id. at 1213.
3. Id. at 1215, citing Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840, 845 (La. 1974), where the
court held: "The one year limitation on redhibitory actions does not apply where
the seller (manufacturer) had knowledge of the defect but failed to declare it at the
time of the sale. Article 2534. In such instance, the consumer may institute the
action to recover for the redhibitory defect within the year following his discovery
of it. Article 2546."
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of one year liberative prescription to Larrison's reconventional demand for
its damage of loss as against Stauffer was correctly sustained below."
4
Yet the court, making a one hundred and eighty degree turn, proceeded to
state that "Larrison's third party (indemnity) demand for judgment over
and against Stauffer (its warrantor) has not prescribed. Judgment sustain-
ing the exception of prescription and dismissing the third party (indemnity)
demand against Stauffer is reversed." 5
Pretermitting here all issues of procedure, 6 this case appears some-
what troublesome and disturbing in at least two respects: first, because of
improper legal qualification of the facts, the court placed itself in a bind;
second, the court paid little heed to the essential prerequisites of the direct
action in allowing it in a lapidary and offhand manner.
The Issue of Legal Construction
The line of demarcation between the determination of "error as to the
cause or as to the object of a contract" and the acknowledgement of the
existence of a vice or defect which "renders the thing sold useless, or its
use so inconvenient and imperfect that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice," 7 is often a very
thin one to tread, and yet the legal consequences flowing from the decision
the trier of the facts has to make can be of such paramount importance that
that decision should be made only after a careful and thorough analysis of
the purposes and foundations of the legal institutions involved. The sale of
any product, in a consumer protection-oriented society such as ours,
immediately triggers in one's mind the issue of warranty to such an extent
that one may be led to forget that a sale is first and foremost a convention
or contract and that, as such, it must meet the requirements of article 1819
of the Louisiana Civil Code. 8
4. 342 So. 2d at 1216-17.
5. Id. at 1217.
6. The relevance and importance of these procedural issues should not be
underestimated but they are beyond the narrow scope of this essay.
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520: "Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account
of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless,
or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice."
8. Id. art. 1819: "Consent being the concurrence of intention in two or more
persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally communicated, and
resulting in each party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that
there is no consent, not only where the intent has not been mutually communicated
or implied, as is provided in the preceding paragraph, but also where it has been
produced by-Error; Fraud; Violence; Threats."
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In the case under consideration it is not conclusively established that
the liquid herbicide was defective-that there was an inherent defect in its
chemical composition which rendered it "useless or so inconvenient and
imperfect . . . . ",9 Rather, it is reported that "when aerially sprayed" or
when "aerially applied" the herbicide was not effective. These expres-
sions convey quite a different implication from that attached to the state-
ment that the herbicide was defective as a result of a latent defect. The
"defect," so to speak, was in the use that the farmer made of an otherwise
sound product. This factual determination leads one to consider the fol-
lowing two alternatives:
First, if the farmer had informed the seller that he intended to make
an aerial application of the herbicide or had the seller been in a position
where he could easily have been presumed to know the manner in which
the farmer was going to use the herbicide," ° it then fell on the seller to
instruct the farmer-buyer as to the proper way to spray the herbicide
aerially. The failure by the seller to fulfill this obligation going to the very
reason why the farmer switched from one method of use of the herbicide to
another would inevitably lead the buyer-farmer to make an error as to the
cause of the contract under the provision of article 1826 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.l" The facts of the case clearly show that Larrison switched
from the pellet form of the herbicide to its liquid form because it could be
sprayed aerially, a rather common technique in these days when economy
of time and money are important motivating factors. Under this alternative
the action available to Larrison would have been one for rescission of the
contract on the ground of error in the cause of the contract and the
prescriptive period of this action would have been five years.'
2
9. See note 7, supra, for text of article 2520.
10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1931: "A contract may be violated, either actively by
doing something inconsistent with the obligation it has proposed or passively by not
doing what was covenanted to be done, or not doing it at the time, or in the manner
stipulated or implied from the nature of the contract." Id. art. 1958: "But if the
doubt or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explanation which one of the
parties ought to have given, or from any other negligence or fault of his, the
construction most favorable to the other party shall be adopted, whether he be
obligor or obligee."
11. Id. art. 1826: "No error in the motive can invalidate a contract, unless the
other party was apprised that it was the principal cause of the agreement, or unless
from the nature of the transaction it must be presumed that he knew it." The
concept of cause is to be understood in its modern rather than classical sense. See
S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS in 6 LA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE 554 nn.308-313 (1969).
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3542: "The following actions are prescribed by five
years: That for the nullity or rescission of contracts, testaments or other acts. That
[Vol. 38
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The second alternative, which the writer prefers over the previous
one, would hold that the seller's breach of his obligation to do, 3 that is to
say the breach of his obligation to instruct the buyer of the most efficient
way to make use of the principal object of the contract, the liquid
herbicide, was tantamount to the non-performance of the object of a
secondary obligation of the contract of sale. Such a violation of "one of
the incidents of his obligations"' 4 by the seller would render him liable to
the payment of damages. Under this alternative the prescriptive period
governing an action for breach of contract would have been ten years
under article 3544 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
15
Under either alternative, therefore, the court of appeal would not
have had to tangle with the one year prescriptive period of an action on
warranty.
The Availability Vel Non of the Direct Action
In the opinion of the court of appeal, the prescriptive period of the
redhibitory action that would have been available to the buyer, Larrison,
against his seller, Cotton States, and the manufacturer, Stauffer Chemical,
for the reduction of excessive donations. That for the rescission of partitions and
guarantee of the portions. This prescription only commences against minors after
their majority." See Williams v. Collier, 249 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); S.
LITVINOFF, supra note 10, at 605 n.66.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1926: "On the breach of any obligation to do, or not to
do, the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which permit it, to a
specific performance of the contract, at his option, or he may require the dissolu-
tion of the contract, and in all these cases damages may be given where they have
accrued, according to the rules established in the following section."
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1930 (emphasis added). The complete article provides:
"The obligations of contract [contracts] extending to whatsoever is incident to such
contracts, the party who violates them, is liable, as one of the incidents of his
obligations, to the payment of the damages, which the party has sustained by his
default." Additional codal support for such secondary obligations can be found in
articles 1901 and 2315.
15. Id. art. 3544: "In general, all personal actions, except those before
enumerated, are prescribed by ten years." See Crowley Grain Drier, Inc. v.
Fontenot, 132 So. 2d 573, 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ("Ordinarily, as the defend-
ants contend, the prescription applicable for damages caused by a breach of
contract is not a one year prescription, but is rather the ten year prescription
provided by LSA-Civil Code Article 3544 . . . .However, unlike damages for
other contractual breaches, damages caused by a breach of the warranty in a
contract of sale are regarded as founded upon redhibition and subject instead to the
cited codal prescription of one year applicable to redhibitory actions.").
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had prescribed 16 and so had the reconventional demand.17 However, the
court must have resorted to "equity" to remedy the "harshness of the
law" in holding that Larrison's indemnity over and against Stauffer
"based upon Stauffer's manufacturer's warranty" 18 had not prescribed.
16. 342 So. 2d at 1216, 1217.
17. Quae temporalia sunt ad agendum, perpetua sunt ad excipiendum. See
Lastrapes v. Rocquet, 23 La. Ann. 68 (1871): "The rule [quae temporalia. . . . is
intended as a shield, and not as a weapon of attack; as, when a purchaser is sued for
the price of property, he may set up a redhibitory defect, deficiency in quantity, and
the like, although the right of a direct action, arising from such cause may be
prescribed."
See also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Grapico Bottling Works, 1 La. App. 638, 639
(1925):
The redhibitory action is prescribed by one year. C.C. 2534. It is therefore
obvious that he [defendant] could not have instituted an action in redhibition at
the time that he filed his demand in reconvention in this suit, on December 6,
1923, for such demand had then already prescribed. But under the doctrine of
"quae temporalia sunt ad agendum, etc.," defendant had the right to use as a
defense, when sued for the price, that which he could not have used as a
weapon of attack.
By reason of the same rule, while it is true that defendant may use, even
after prescription has accrued, the redhibitory vice of the thing as a shield
against plaintiff's attack for recovery of its purchase price, he cannot use such
vice as a weapon against plaintiff to recover after accrual of prescription
money already paid as part of such purchase price.
See also Rapides Grocery Co. v. Clopton, 171 La. 632, 635, 131 So. 734, 735 (1930):
We agree with the district judge that Clopton's reconventional demand for
damages is barred by the prescription of one year. The demand is founded
upon redhibition-the annulling of a sale because of a defect in the thing sold.
Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2520 . . . . As the defendant, Clopton, did not sue for
damages within the year after he discovered that the soy beans were worth-
less-if in fact they were worthless-his demand for damages is barred by the
prescription of one year, even if it should be assumed that the seller knew that
the beans were worthless ....
In a suit for the price of a thing sold, redhibition may be urged as a defense,
or want of consideration, even though the action for redhibition would be
otherwise barred by the prescription of one year ....
See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 424 ("cause of action as a defense"), as amended by 1977
La. Acts, No. 254. See Christy-Ann-Lea, Inc. v. Charter Homes of La., Inc., 327
So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
18. 342 So. 2d at 1216. The Court's indirect reliance on the case of Edward
Levy Metals, Inc. v. New Orleans Pub. Belt R.R., 243 La. 860, 148 So. 2d 580 (1963)
is inopportune. Edward Levy Metals was a true case of unjust enrichment or quasi-
contract and ought not to have been relied upon by the Cotton States court in the
context of the facts before it. In Edward Levy Metals, the supreme court held:
The theory of the argument is that the scrap steel in question was loaded on
board ship for the account of Southern Scrap Material Company, Ltd. The
effect of this was to unjustly enrich Southern Scrap Material Company, Ltd.,
[Vol. 38
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The strange and worrisome outcome of this holding is that Larrison's
direct action against Stauffer, although prescribed between these parties,
manages somehow, by way of the third party demand, to be resuscitated
when the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer-seller is
thrown into the debate. The court relies on article 1111 of the Code of
Civil Procedure 9 as support for its decision and finds in the statement that
"the defendant . . . may bring in any person, including a codefendant,
who is his warrantor" sufficient justification for holding Stauffer liable to
Larrison.
It is now a well established jurisprudential rule that the buyer of a
"thing" has a direct action against the manufacturer as "a warrantor."
However, the direct action ought not to be allowed when its exercise
would defeat its raison d'6tre.
The so-called "direct action" affords a creditor (Larrison in the case
at the expense of New Orleans Public Belt Railroad which is charged by its
contract of affreightment with the responsibility for the safekeeping and proper
delivery of the scrap steel according to the instructions of the shipper. The
violation of its contract with the shipper that occurs by permitting the errone-
ous delivery to Southern Scrap Material Company, Ltd., impoverishes the
railroad and enriches Southern Scrap Material Company, Ltd. Thus, we under-
stand the argument to be that Southern Scrap Material Company, Ltd., under
Articles 2292, 2293, 2294 and 2301 of the LSA-Civil Code, having received
what was not due it through error, is obliged to restore it to the owner, Edward
Levy Metals, Inc., or to New Orleans Public Railroad from which it has unduly
received it; and this obligation is a quasi contractual one that is enforceable by
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad against Southern Scrap Material Company,
Ltd. Such an obligation gives rise to a personal action and is prescribed in ten
years under Article 3544 of the LSA-Civil Code . . . . Rather, we think the
claim is one in indemnity, which is quasi contractual and governed by the
prescription of Article 3544 of the LSA-Civil Code. The obligation that the
third party plaintiff is seeking to enforce here is one for unjust enrichment to be
enforced in the future . ...
Id. at 581-83.
19. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. I111 provides:
The defendant in a principal action by petition may bring in any person,
including a codefendant, who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the principal demand.
In such cases the plaintiff in the principal action may assert any demand
against the third party defendant arising out of or connected with the principal
demand. The third party defendant thereupon shall plead his objections and
defenses in the manner prescribed in Articles 921 through 969, 1003 through
1006, and 1035. He may reconvene against the plaintiff in the principal action or
the third party plaintiff, on any demand arising out of or connected with the
principal demand, in the manner prescribed in Articles 1061 through 1066.
See Motors Sec. Co. v. Hines, 85 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
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on the issue of warranty) the right to bring an action against its debtor's
(Cotton States) debtor (Stauffer) because of the existence of a legal
relationship between the latter two debtors.2" This "direct action" is,
therefore, not so direct since there must exist, between the creditor-
plaintiff and the third party debtor-defendant, an intermediate debtor
whose rights against that third party debtor are exercised by the creditor.2
There are, thus, two sets of rights co-existing: first, those rights that the
creditor holds against the debtor with whom he has privity; and second,
those rights that this debtor holds against his own debtor. These two sets of
rights are inseparable one from the other; they are the two indispensable
cornerstones of the whole edifice of the direct action. It ensues logically
that should the intermediate debtor (Cotton States) have no right of action
against his own debtor (Stauffer) there can be no direct action available to
the creditor since the latter is actually attempting to exercise a non-existent
right. Indeed, a creditor can "direct action" a third party debtor only to
the extent and within the confines of the rights that his immediate debtor
holds against that third party debtor. Accordingly, should this third party
debtor (Stauffer) have exceptions or defenses that he could have raised
against his own creditor (Cotton States), he (the third party debtor) can
raise the same exceptions and defenses against the original creditor (Larri-
son).22 Likewise, should the original creditor (Larrison) have no right of
20. Several theories have been put forward to justify the availability of the
direct action: 1) Stipulation pour autrui; 2) Transmission theory; 3) Subrogation
theory. See Barham, Redhibition: A Comparative Comment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 376,
389 (1975).
21. It is impossible to give here a legal analysis of the direct action, but see H.
MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD & J. MAZEAUD, 1 LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS
802, 806 (5th ed. 1973); B. STARCK, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 2576, 2580
(1972); A. WEILL & F. TERRE, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 859 (2d ed. 1975);
Comment, Direct Actions-Insurance Contracts, 13 LA. L. REV. 495 (1953).
22. With the exception of the defenses strictly personal to the defendant, the
third party defendant can raise against the plaintiff all other defenses which would
have been available to the defendant. Prescription is one such defense available to
the third party defendant. Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840, 845 (La. 1974) ("The
consumer's action is enforceable against the manufacturer at the same time and at
least within the same year following the sale to the consumer, Article 2534, as it is
enforceable against the seller. ") (emphasis added). See Stelly v. Gerber Prod. Co.,
299 So. 2d 529, 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) ("The purchase brought certain
contractual obligations including subrogation of contractual obligations. The
consumption brought damage and an obligation upon defendant to repair that
damage, which defendant's 'unlawful' or wrongful act caused. But both the latter
delictual action and the former contractual action have been prescribed by the
passage of more than one year.").
[Vol. 38
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action against his immediate debtor (Cotton States) or should he have lost
his right of action through his own fault, he would fail to possess the key
that would give him access to the direct action, and he would find no
bridge linking him to the third party debtor. In other words, the direct
action ought to be denied because there exists a cause to the original
creditor's legal predicament. Since the court considered that the issue was
one of "warranty" and opined that the one year prescriptive period of the
redhibitory action had run between Larrison and Cotton States, the court
had thereby acknowledged that the loss of the action was justified because
Larrison's predicament had a valid legal cause. In making an about turn
and granting Larrison the right to third party Stauffer as warrantor, the
court failed to give a sound legal basis to its decision and may have
circumvented the regime of the direct action.
RiMiRi, OPTION, SECURITY CONTRACT OR WHAT?
The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit was confronted with a
difficult problem of legal construction in the case of Potts v. Spatafora .23
The court was of the opinion that the contract entered into between the
parties constituted "a sale from Potts to defendant with Potts retaining a
right of redemption" 24 and that Potts had lost his right of redemption after
he had delivered actual possession of the property to the defendant. The
facts, however, could have been read in such a manner as to give them a
legal construction more in accordance with the provisions of the contract
and with the intent of the parties.
The facts reported in the decision were as follows: by an act of sale
dated January 6, 1961, Larkin Potts conveyed ninety-three and one-half
acres of land to the defendant, Thomas Spatafora, for a cash payment of
$4,281.49. The purchase price was paid to Henry Stevenson, to whom
Larkin Potts was indebted on account of a loan secured by a mortgage. On
January 30, 1961, Potts and Spatafora signed an agreement whereby "the
land would be reconveyed to Potts if he paid $4,200 with eight per cent
interest within four years.' '25 In the spring of the year 1965, therefore
more than four years after the January 30, 1961 agreement, Larkin Potts
offered to pay Spatafora the sum owed so that he could obtain the
reconveyance of the property. Spatafora refused to reconvey the property
on the ground that "the period of redemption had expired." Larkin Potts
23. Potts v. Spatafora, 340 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 415, 416.
25. Id. at 415.
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having died in 1974, his surviving spouse and heirs brought an action
against Spatafora for redemption of the property on the theory that the
January 30, 1961 contract was only a security device which afforded
plaintiffs the right to reimburse the amount still owed this defendant who
would, in turn, reconvey the property. The court adopted the defendant's
position and held that "Potts' right of redemption was preserved as long as
he remained in possession of the property. Theright was lost, however,
and defendant's title was perfected and became absolute when actual
possession was delivered to defendant.' '26
After a review of the relevant distinctive features of a sale with the
power of redemption the writer will analyze the decision of the court
against its doctrinal background.
Relevant Distinctive Features of a Sale with the Power of Redemption
A sale with the power of redemption, or vente 6 rimeri, has for its
primary purpose27 to enable an owner in dire need of money to satisfy that
need by selling his thing, whether movable or immovable, with the hope,
however, of being able to resume its ownership sometime in the future by
paying back to the purchaser the price the latter had paid in the original
transaction. By this legal and financial device the owner-vendor of the
thing can expect to receive in money the true market value of his property
which he might not have been able to obtain had he mortgaged or pledged
the same property assuming, even, he could have done so. This device,
however, is subject to some legal requirements which ensure its originality
vis a vis other devices but at the same time cast it in a strict legal mould.
The following three requirements 28 are particularly relevant to the case
under discussion and deserve some comment here: a) price, b) intent of the
parties, and c) delay.
The Requirement of Price
Article 2567 of the Louisiana Civil Code stipulates that the vendor
can take his thing back "by returning the price paid for it. "29 Since the
exercise of the right of redemption carries with it the rescission of the sale
26. Id. at 416.
27. See Delcambre v. Dubois, 263 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
28. These three requirements are in addition to the requirements of object,
capacity and publicity.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2567 provides: "The right of redemption is an agree-
ment or paction, by which the vendor reserves to himself the power of taking back
the thing sold by returning the price paid for it."
(Vol. 38
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and aims at placing the parties back in the status quo ante, operating like a
resolutory condition, the vendor must pay back to the purchaser the exact
price he had received--' 'the price paid for it." One must ask, however,
whether the return of the price paid for it is a rule of public order"° or only
a suppletory rule of law to be applied in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary? In other words, can the price of redemption be superior or
inferior to the original price and the sale still qualify as a sale with the right
of redemption?
Should the price to return be inferior to the price paid there is, a
priori, no objective reason to be suspicious of such a stipulation since the
buyer-owner may have made such use of the thing or drawn so many
benefits from it as to be considered as having been compensated for the
difference in the prices. Yet, if the price to return is "out of proportion" 31
with the price paid, it might be possible to establish that the true cause of
the transaction was a gratuitous one rather than an onerous one, a
simulated donation from the purchaser to the vendor for instance. On the
other hand, should the price to return be superior to the price paid,32 it
becomes very important to ascertain whether or not the difference in the
prices is "out of proportion." If the price to return is so inflated as to be
out of proportion with the price paid, there arises a strong suspicion that
the so-called sale was actually meant to be an usurious loan or a pignora-
tive contract with a prohibited commissoria lex. 33 The parties might also
30. Id. arts. 11, 12.
31. Id. art. 2464. The first and fourth paragraphs of this article read as follows:
paragraph one: "The price of the sale must be certain, that is to say, fixed and
determined by the parties"; paragraph four: "It ought not to be out of all proportion
with the value of the thing; for instance the sale of a plantation for a dollar could not
be considered as a fair sale; it would be considered as a donation disguised."
32. Several commentators recognize that the price to return can be superior to
the price paid. See 5 C. AUBRY ETC. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 357 n.3 (1936);
17 G. BAUDRY-LANCANTINERIE ET L. SAIGNAT, DE LA VENTE ET DE L'ECHANGE
648 (2d ed. 1900); 3 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD ET J. MAZEAUD, supra note 21,
919 (4th ed. 1974); 10 M. PLANIOL ET G. RPERT, TRAITi DE DROIT CIVIL 201 (2d
ed. 1956); R. POTHIER, VENTE 414 (1806).
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3165.
"Article 3165 of the Revised Civil Code provides for the procedure to be taken
by the creditor when his debtor defaults. At the present time, we do not find that its
provisions have been so extended as to permit a creditor to appropriate to himself
the debtor's pledge. The jurisprudence and law review treatises indicate that such
would be incompatible with the pledgee's fiduciary character." D'Amico v.
Canizaro, 256 La. 801, 239 So. 2d 339, 342 (1970) (citations omitted).
"Under the settled law of this state, the pledgee has no authority to dispose of
or declare himself to be the owner of the object in pledge absent the express
1978]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
agree that the price to return shall be superior to the price paid but without
creating such a difference in the amounts as to arouse any legitimate
suspicion. The parties could agree, for instance, that the seller would pay
an interest on the price such that when the right of redemption is exercised
the original purchaser will have actually made a profit in the amount of the
interest he received on the price. This profit could have been realized by
the purchaser over and above the "fruits" he gathered as owner under the
sale 34 which fruits the purchaser keeps upon rescission of the sale as per
article 2586 of the Civil Code.
35
There is no codal provision, however, dealing with the right of the
purchaser to keep also the interest on the price. One must therefore
conclude that, since the parties have to be returned to the status quo ante
when redemption is exercised, the purchaser ought to return to the seller
the amount of the interest he received in order not to be remunerated twice
for the same act or to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the seller.
Some commentators have suggested the following approach to this issue:
the original purchaser is entitled to keep the fruits because they are the
compensation both for his efforts and for the interest on the price; conse-
quently, if the thing is productive of fruits the purchaser is not entitled to
the payment of interest besides, the fruits being kept by him in lieu of
interests; on the other hand, if the thing is not productive of fruits, the
purchaser is entitled to claim the payment of interest as a substitute for the
lack of fruits. 36 To sum up, although there can exist a valid sale with the
power of redemption when the price to return is superior to the price paid,
the trier of the facts ought to deny this legal qualification to a sale wherein
the purchaser would keep both the fruits and the interest.
Intent of the Parties
Since the Civil Code defines, in part, a sale with the right of
redemption as one where the price to be returned is the price paid, it is of
agreement of the pledgor.'" Steiner v. Zammit, 279 So. 2d 728, 729 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2575: "The fruits are his until the vendor exercises his
right of redemption."
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2586: "When a vendor exercises the right of redemp-
tion, he becomes entitled to all the fruits not yet gathered, from the day in which he
has either reimbursed or consigned the money paid by the purchaser, unless the
contrary has been stipulated."
36. C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 32, 357 n. 19; G. BAUDRY-LANCANTINERIE
ET L. SAIGNAT, supra note 32, 651; H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD ET J. MAZEAUD,
supra note 21, 919; M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 10, 201, 204.
[Vol. 38
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the utmost importance to determine exactly the intent of the parties
whenever they have deviated from the suppletive law of the Code. The
principle of the autonomy of the will governing the law of obligations, it is
within the power of parties to a contract to set out their rights and
obligations as they please within the confines of the rules of public order.
It is conceivable, therefore, for parties to enter into a contract of sale
which borrows many of the legal characteristics of a sale with the right of
redemption but which, nevertheless, was not meant to be so qualified. It is
very easy indeed, for instance, to confuse a unilateral promise to sell or a
bilateral promise to sell with a vente 6 rgm&.
The concept of unilateral promise of sale is best described by Profes-
sor Litvinoff, in his typically precise and incisive analysis, in these words:
The expression "promise of sale" is here used as having a wider
meaning than "promise to sell". It comprises not only the latter, but
also a promise to buy, which is subject to the same rules . . .37
The promise of sale is dealt with in article 2462 of the Louisiana
Civil Code .... 38
The unilateral promise of sale under the second paragraph of
article 2462, is now a commutative contract--one party gives a
promise, the other, a consideration . . .39
A promise, or a legal relation is, precisely, something intangible
that may serve the function of consideration. If the anatomy of an
option is carefully scrutinized, it is easy to see that the giver of an
option always receives from the promisee an intangible something of
this kind, even when he also receives something tangible besides.'
37. Litvinoff, Of the Promise of Sale and Contract to Sell, 34 LA. L. REV. 1017,
1026 n.59 (1974). See generally 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at 170.
38. Litvinoff, supra note 37, at 1038. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2462, as amended by
1920 La. Acts, No. 27, provides:
A promise to sell, when there exists a reciprocal consent of both parties as
to the thing, the price and terms, and which, if it relates to immovables, is in
writing, so far amounts to a sale, as to give either party the right to enforce
specific performance of same.
One may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject, within a
stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the purchase of such option,
for any consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or promise can not be
withdrawn before the time agreed upon; and should it be accepted within the
time stipulated, the contract or agreement to sell, evidenced by such promise
and acceptance, may be specifically enforced by either party.
39. Litvinoff, supra note 37, at 1039.
40. Id. at 1041.
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To distinguish, therefore, between a promise to sell or purchase (or
re-purchase for that matter) and a right of redemption, one will have to
weigh carefully the words used in their contract by the parties and resort to
the codal articles on interpretation of agreements in case of ambiguity. 4'
Furthermore, one will have to "endeavor to ascertain what was the
common intention of the parties," 4 2 a task which is greatly facilitated by
the existence vel non of an express "reservation" clause in the contract, 43
by the nature of the previous transactions entered into by or between the
parties, or by the sequence of the juridical acts binding the parties. 44
Therefore, in the absence of a provision in the very contract of sale
whereby the vendor has "reserved" the right to redeem, it is highly
possible that the parties never intended to have entered into a sale with the
power of redemption, a rather sophisticated legal institution.
Delay
The right of redemption must be exercised within a maximum legal
delay of ten years or within whatever shorter time the parties have agreed
to. 45 These delays, whether legal or conventional, are of public order in
the sense, first, that they cannot be extended by the judge and, second,
that they operate as a matter of right. 6 This feature of the delay within
which the right of redemption may be exercised is in contrast with the
rules governing the effects of an obligation subject to a term.47
41. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1945-1962.
42. Id. art. 1950 provides: "When there is anything doubtful in agreements, we
must endeavor to ascertain what was the common intention of the parties, rather
than to adhere to the literal sense of the terms."
43. Id. art. 2567: "The right of redemption is an agreement or paction, by
which the vendor reserves to himself the power of taking back the thing sold by
returning the price paid for it." Id. art. 2568: "The right of redemption can not be
reserved for a time exceeding ten years. If a term, exceeding that, has been
stipulated in the agreement, it shall be reduced to the term of ten years."
44. Some French commentators consider that "if a provision for redemption is
added ex intervallo, to a pure and simple sale, it would amount to a promise to re-
sell." 5 C. AUBRY ETC. RAU, supra note 32, 357 n.2. See also R. POTHIER, supra
note 32, 432; 2 R. TROPLONG, DE LA VENTE 694 (1836); Agen.l Juillet 1929, S.
1929, 1, 172.
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2568. See note 43, supra; see LA. CIv. CODE art. 2569:
"The time fixed for the redemption must be rigorously adhered to; it can not be
prolonged by the judge."
46. "As a matter of right": this expression refers to those situations where the
court is denied any discretionary power and must simply recognize the law applica-
ble. This is contrasted with the discretionary power given to a court by article 2047
of the Louisiana Civil Code, for instance.
47. For the definition and concept of "term" see LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2048-
2061.
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A term is a modality, whether implied from the nature of the contract
or agreed to by the parties,4" affecting the timing of the performance of an
obligation,4 9 and where the term is consensual the presumption is that it
has been stipulated in favor of the debtor.50 In a sale with the right of
redemption, there is no doubt that the extinctive term5' is stipulated in
favor of the vendor since he is that party to the contract who has reserved
the exclusive power to redeem at any time up to the expiration date of the
term. 
52
In an option contract, on the other hand, the trier of the fact will have
to determine whether the extinctive term was stipulated in favor of one
party or the other, or both, although it can be presumed that the term has
been stipulated in favor of the beneficiary of the option. Moreover, upon
expiration of the term, the judge, guided by the codal provisions on
interpretation of contracts, will have to rule on whether the term was of the
essence of the contract so that the obligation cannot henceforth be en-
forced or whether it is plausible, on account of the circumstances of the
case or the behavior of the parties since the expiration of the term, to draw
the inference that the term was not such an essential element of the
contract as to bar the parties from performing their obligations beyond the
expiration date of the term. 3 Thus, an option contract or a unilateral
promise to sell subject to a term should not automatically, as a matter of
right, become unenforceable as the power of redemption would under the
specific and mandatory language of the law.
The Decision of the Court and Its Doctrinal Background
In Potts the plaintiff had argued that the contract he had entered into
with the defendant was a security device which afforded him the possibili-
ty to obtain "the reconveyance of the property upon repayment of the
amount owed." ' 54 Since both parties relied mostly on the document of
January 30, 1961, it is appropriate to recite its contents:
48. Id. art. 2050.
49. Id. art. 2051.
50. Id. art. 2053.
51. The "term" is called extinctive because it extinguishes the legal relation-
ship between the parties and operates only prospectively.
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2567; for text, see note 43, supra. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2570 provides: "If that right has not been exercised within the time agreed on by the
vendor, he can not exercise it afterwards, and the purchaser becomes irrevocably
possessed of the thing sold."
53. See id. art. 1956.
54. 340 So. 2d at 415.
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To Whom It May Concern
This is to verify that on the 6th day of January 1961, Thomas D.
Spatafora a resident of Ouachita Parish Louisiana did pay off all
indebtedness on land owned by Larkin Potts in Richland Parish in the
amount of approximately $4,200.00 and deeded to said Thomas D.
Spatafora.
Mr. Spatafora in turn advanced Larkin Potts $400.00 to make
this year's crop and also they agreed that Larkin Potts would repay
the $4,200.00 plus 8 per cent interest within (4) four years from date
and if the above agreement was carried out, that with the money in
hand Thomas D. Spatafora would redeed the above land back to the
said Larkin Potts.5
Sometime in the spring of 1965, Larkin Potts "offered to pay defend-
ant the money owed" but "defendant refused to reconvey the property
because the period of redemption had expired. "56 The question was thus
squarely put to the court: was this agreement between Potts and Spatafora
a sale with the right of redemption?
Let us examine the stipulations of this sale as well as the surrounding
circumstances against the background of the doctrinal analysis of the
requirements of a sale with the right of redemption presented above.
With respect to the price to be repaid by Potts to Spatafora, there does
not seem to be any reliable and safe ground for an argument that it could
not possibly be a valid "redeeming" price. It appears from the records of
the case that Spatafora allowed Potts to farm the land free of charge, which
leads to the conclusion that Spatafora did not receive the fruits of the
property as he would have been entitled to as owner under a sale with the
right of redemption. Consequently, it could be said that Spatafora received
the interest on the price in lieu of the fruits of the property and that,
thereby, the requirement of price in the sale with the right of redemption
was preserved in its integrity.57
As far as the requirement of intent of the parties is concerned, it is
difficult to find in the four corners of the contract any clue to their
motivating intent. If the January 6, 1961 agreement was unquestionably a
sale from Potts to Spatafora and contained not "a speck of redemption,"
55. Record No. 13085 (La. App. 2d Cir.).
56. 340 So. 2d at 415.
57. One could ask the question: what difference is there, as far as the price is
concerned, between this type of financial arrangement and a contract of loan on
interest? See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2923, 2924.
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the subsequent agreement of January 30 requires careful scrutiny before
one can venture an opinion.
This later agreement is divided into two paragraphs of unequal
importance: in the first paragraph, the parties simply restated that the
nature of the January 6, 1961 agreement was that of a sale from Potts to
Spatafora; the second paragraph, on the other hand, purports to reflect a
change of minds of the parties in such a way that, when the two documents
of January are read together, they "constitute a sale from Potts to defend-
ant with Potts retaining a right of redemption."- 58 The weight of the
evidence reported in the record of the case, as well as in the briefs, tilts the
scale in favor of the plaintiff who thought that the January 30 agreement
was but a security device somewhat similar to those he had negotiated on
many occasions in the past. Furthermore, the language used in the.second
paragraph appears to be in support of the plaintiff's argument when read as
follows: the first sentence of that paragraph indicates that Spatafora is
"advancing" $400.00 to Potts thereby introducing the idea of a "loan";
this idea of a loan is then carried over into the second sentence by the use
of the verb "repay" 59-a verb which is often used in day to day language
in formulas such as "repayment of a loan." An additional element which
must have heavily contributed to the plaintiff's thinking that he was
negotiating a loan, was his obligation to pay "interest" on the amount
received, an obligation which, in the mind of someone who can neither
write nor read,' must be closely associated with the well known business
practice of making loans rather than with the highly technical and most
sophisticated concept of sale with redemption. Finally, the fact that Potts
was allowed to remain on the property must have convinced him even
more so than "legal technicalities" that he was still the owner although he
had "deeded" the land to Spatafora as a guarantee of his "repayment."
As for Spatafora's understanding of the nature of the agreement he
had entered into, there is no doubt that he believed he had become the
owner of the land and was not simply a money lender with a security.
However, although it is undeniable that Spatafora considered himself the
owner, we suspect that he did not look upon the January 30, 1961
agreement as a sale with the power of redemption but rather as "an
agreement granting Potts the right to repurchase the land within four (4)
58. 340 So. 2d at 415-16.
59. Verbs synonymous with "repay" are: refund, reimburse, return, restore.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (4th ed. 1951).
60. See Record No. 13085 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (page 2 of plaintiff's appellant
brief).
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years," 6 1 in other words, as a sale with an option to repurchase in four
years. 62 Option contracts, in comparison with sales with the power of
redemption, are the more common practice and, accordingly, the trier of
fact ought to approach this issue of legal qualification with the wisdom and
prudence enshrined in the principle that exceptio est strictissimae inter-
pretationis.
There was a misunderstanding between the parties, a lack of agree-
ment as to the legal definition of their agreement, their minds failed to
meet on the nature of the contract and so in the prophetic words of Civil
Code article 1841,
Error as to the nature of the contract will render it void. The nature of
the contract is that which characterizes the obligation which it
creates. Thus, if the party receives property, and from error or
ambiguity in the words accompanying the delivery, believes that he
has purchased, while he who delivers intends only to pledge there is
not [no] contract.6 3
61. Id. (defendant-appellee's original brief at page 4).
62. It must be pointed out here that if the parties and the court had truly
considered the sale to be one with the power of redemption, the perfection of title in
the vendee would have occurred automatically as a matter of right on January 30,
1965 (or closely thereabout), and not later "when actual possession was delivered to
defendant." 340 So. 2d at 416. The labeling of the principal contract entered into by
the parties as a "security contract" is a misnomer since a security contract is an
accessory contract which can have no legal existence unless it is attached to a valid
principal contract. What the courts have done in fact is create a contract "sui
generis" to serve the needs of business transactions and, if such is the case, let us
"nominate" this contract rather than "regard it as... if... and if." Id. at 416.
See esp. Latiolais v. Breaux, 154 La. 1006, 98 So. 620 (1923).
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1841. See 4 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGA-
TIONS 75 (1976) (L'erreur-obstacle I Erreur sur la nature du contrat); PH. MALIN-
VAUD, LES MECANISMES JURIDIQUES DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES, DROIT DES
OBLIGATIONS 33 (erreur-obsticle); B. STARCK, supra note 21, § 1334 at 418; A.
WEIL ET F. TERRE, supra note 21, at 176 ("Cas ou I'erreur detruit le consentement
(erreur-obstacle)").
